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Abstract
We survey some basic mathematical structures, which arguably are more primitive
than the structures taught at school. These structures are orders, with or without com-
position, and (symmetric) monoidal categories. We list several ‘real life’ incarnations
of each of these. This chapter also serves as an introduction to these structures and their
current and potentially future uses in linguistics, physics and knowledge representation.
This paper is the introductory chapter of the volume [35], which collects a range
of tutorial papers spanning a wide range of subjects employing structures of the kind
discussed here, authored by leaders of their respective fields.
What are the fundamental mathematical structures? Evidently, in order to address this
question one first needs to address another question, namely, the question on what a math-
ematical structure actually is. There are several options available.
Are mathematical structures the objects of mathematical theories? And is it then the
mathematician who decides which ones are truly fundamental? It is indeed often said by
mathematicians that good mathematics is what good mathematicians do. It has also been
strongly argued by mathematicians, that good mathematics should be a discipline which
exists in isolation from the (other) natural sciences, e.g. by Bourbaki, and that the use of
example applications and illustrations outside of straight mathematics is to be discouraged.
We find these views somewhat circular and solipsistic, and even disrespectful to the other
disciplines, in the light of the origins and history of mathematics.
From an alternative more reductionist perspective, one may think that the fundamen-
tal mathematical structures are the simple things from which one can build more complex
things. Proposed candidates of fundamental structures include the Platonic solids from
which the classical elements (Earth, Water, Air, and Fire) were constructed, and more
recently, sets, which within the realm of set-theory are supposed to underpin all of mathe-
matics. In our digital age, 0’s and 1’s underpin all of our data. So do 0’s and 1’s constitute
the appropriate language of communicating our opinions about the movies that are encoded
in terms of 0’s and 1’s on a computer’s hard drive? Of course not. The fact that one can
‘code’ everything by means of one particular structure, just as most modern mathematics
can be encoded in sets, does not mean that it is the most convenient language for discourse.
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2Or, are fundamental mathematical structures the objects which underpin the world in
which we live, i.e. our reality? This raises the question, what do we mean by reality? Is this
restricted to material reality or does this also include the stuff going on in our minds? In
Aristotelianism numbers exist as concepts, which means that they do exist, but only in our
mind. So where were those numbers before there were any minds that they could inhabit.
Today, number-based calculus is still a pillar of modern mathematics, and many other fields
of mathematics have some sort of numbers (be it either integer, real or complex) as their
starting point. At school, first we learn natural numbers, then negatives, then rationals,
reals, and eventually complex numbers. We can organize these as matrices yielding vector
spaces, which is probably the most prominent mathematical structure at the moment. This
points at these number systems maybe being the fundamental mathematical structures.
In this paper we will preach an alternative Gospel, which qualifies structures in terms of
their high-levelness in use. As a starting point, we try to analyze several forms of practice,
starting in fact with ‘counting’ as underpinning trade, as well as basic mathematical practice
and its relation to speech and reasoning, as well as nature. This is by no means a thorough
development but just a few stone throws towards trying to develop a story of this kind.
Our preliminary development involves three stages:
(1) Firstly, we considered ordering of things.
(2) Secondly, we assume that these things can be composed.
(2’) These ordered composable things also provide a stepping stone to the next
stage. We can consider processes on a single thing that can be composed in
time, and that moreover happen to be ordered. Dropping this ordering yields a
stage (2’) which is complementary to (2). Together, stages (2) and (2’) combine
into the remaining stage, that is:
(3) We consider processes, composable in time, for composable things.
(1)
}} ))
(2)
!!
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}}
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(3)
We will make a case for why we consider these structures as fundamental.
For each of these stages we provide a number of example applications in different areas,
which indicate the general discipline transcending nature of theses structures. We consider
this as additional evidence of the foundational nature of these structures.
But as a matter of convenience, we will still rely on set theory to provide us with a
notion of equality in the formal definitions, as this will appeal to what the reader is used
too. And of course, most existing example applications that we want to present have been
formulated in set-theoretic terms, so we don’t really have much choice here. However, it
should be clear that these examples have a ‘meaning in reality’ which does not require this
3particular underpinning. We will illustrate this for one specific example. Consider the case
of describing the possible states of three things ‘in set theory vs. in reality’.
In set theory, each of these things will be some structured set, that is, a set X together
with additional operations which may encode topology (a collection of open subsets), ge-
ometry (lines etc.), or algebraic structure (e.g. a binary operation). The operation ‘putting
things together’ would be encoded in most cases as a cartesian product. Focussing from
now on only on the supporting sets, we can build a triple of things in three manners:
• First we combine X and Y into X × Y := {(x, y) | x ∈ X, y ∈ Y} and then we combine
X × Y and Z into (X × Y) × Z := {((x, y), z) | x ∈ X, y ∈ Y, z ∈ Z}.
• First we combine Y and Z into Y × Z := {(y, z) | y ∈ Y, z ∈ Z} and then we combine X
and Y × Z into X × (Y × Z) := {(x, (y, z)) | x ∈ X, y ∈ Y, z ∈ Z}.
• We do everything at once by considering triples {(x, y, z) | x ∈ X, y ∈ Y, z ∈ Z}.
Now, the three results are not equal! Instead, they are isomorphic in a very ‘natural’ manner,
since we can pass from {((x, y), z) | x ∈ X, y ∈ Y, z ∈ Z} to {(x, (y, z)) | x ∈ X, y ∈ Y, z ∈ Z} by
‘re-bracketting’, and to {(x, y, z) | x ∈ X, y ∈ Y, z ∈ Z} by ‘dumping brackets’.
Clearly ‘re-bracketting’ and ‘dumping brackets’ are operations that have many nice
properties, which boil down to saying that each of these three ways of combining three
things are essentially the same for all practical purposes. But to properly state this in
mathematical terms requires some pretty heavy machinery. For example, simply saying
that these are isomorphic is not enough, since along such an isomorphism we may loose
the fact that we truly are considering three things, e.g.
{0, 1} × {0, 1} × {0, 1} ' {0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7} .
To capture the ‘natural’ manner in which constructions like
{((x, y), z) | x ∈ X, y ∈ Y, z ∈ Z} and {(x, (y, z)) | x ∈ X, y ∈ Y, z ∈ Z}
are equivalent Eilenberg and MacLane introduced category theory, which first required
to define categories, then functors, and finally natural transformations [29], a highly non-
trivial concept. For something as simple as saying that there are three things, these concepts
feel a bit like overkill. Indeed, in reality, given three objects, it simply doesn’t matter that
we first consider two of them together, and then the third one, or the other way around, in
order to describe the end result. In other words, the bracketing in the above description has
no counterpart in reality, it is merely imposed on us by set theory!
But make no mistake, it is not category theory that we blame here in any manner, but
set theory. Certain branches of category theory have no problem in describing three things
on an equal footing, in terms of so-called strict symmetric monoidal categories. True, in its
usual presentations (e.g. [51]) it is build upon set theory, but not to do so is exactly what
we are arguing for here. An elaborate discussion of this point can be found in [23]. Also,
category theory is a huge area and by no means all of it will be relevant here.
41 Order
Above we mentioned that number-based calculus is a pillar of modern mathematics.
But probably more primal than counting is the simple fact wether one number is larger
than another. If numbers characterize the cost of something, say a piece of meat, being
able to afford that piece of meat requires one to have more money available than the cost of
that piece of meat. The meaningfulness of the question “Can I afford this piece of meat?”
results from the fact that numbers are ordered: if x is the price and y is one’s budget, then
‘Yes I can!” means x ≤ y while “No I cannot!” means x  y.
Definition 1. A total ordering on a set X is a relation ≤ on X, i.e. a collection of pairs
(x, y) ⊆ X × X which is anti-symmetric, transitive and total, that is, respectively,
• ∀x, y ∈ X : x ≤ y, y ≤ x⇒ x = y
• ∀x, y, z ∈ X : x ≤ y, y ≤ z⇒ x ≤ z
• ∀x, y, z ∈ X : x ≤ y or y ≤ x
Of course, one cannot compare apples and lemons, if we don’t consider monetary value.
Three apples are less than four apples, but what about three apples versus three lemons?
Definition 2. A preordering on X is a transitive relation . which is also reflexive, that is,
• ∀x ∈ X : x . x
A partial ordering is an anti-symmetric preordering, and denoted ≤.
By definition, each partial ordering is a preordering, and also, each total ordering is a
partial ordering since totality implies reflexivity (apply totality when x = y).
Moreover, each preordering yields an equivalence relation, which is defined as a pre-
ordering ' which is also symmetric, that is,
• ∀x, y ∈ X : x ' y⇔ y ' x ,
simply by setting x ' y to be x . y and y . x. Then, the corresponding set of equivalence
classes {Cx | x ∈ X}, where Cx = {y ∈ X | y ' x}, forms a partial ordering when setting
Cx ≤ Cy whenever x . y. For example, if we order things in terms of their cost we obtain
a preordering, since there may be many things that have the same cost. This gives rise to a
partial ordering, which is in fact a total ordering, of the occurring costs themselves.
Sometimes one encounters the notion of a strict partial order <, which is irreflexive
(x  x), asymmetric (a < b ⇒ b ≮ a) and transitive, but it is easily seen that each partial
ordering as in Defn. 2 induces a strict partial ordering by setting x < y when x ≤ y and
x , y; conversely, x ≤ y when x < y or x = y turns a strict partial ordering into a partial
ordering as in Defn. 2. So both notions are equivalent in their uses.
Preorderings and partial orderings arise in many everyday situations, as well as in im-
portant areas of science. Arguably, they are the most primitive mathematical concept imag-
inable, capturing the very basic notion of ‘comparing’.
51.1 Reachability, causality and relativity
Consider a collection of events, a certain rock concert in New Orleans on a particular day,
the marriage of some old friend, Carnival in Rio this year, etc. Then there exists a partial
ordering where the relation ≤ stands for: “if I attend event a, can I also attend event b?”
Otherwise put, the ordering a ≤ b captures wether one can reach event b from event a. The
overall data in this partial ordering is imposed by the transport network of the world.
In physics, due to the velocity bound imposed by the speed of light, a similar partial
order exists which encodes wether light can travel from one point x in space-time to another
point y in space-time. In the case of yes we can write x ≤ y. And since nothing travels
faster than time, this partial order encodes which event in space-time can causally affect
which other event in space-time. In fact, there exist results that enable one to reconstruct
the entire geometric space-time manifold from this partial ordering e.g. [55]. There are
moreover several research programs that take partial ordering not only as a framework
for discussing special and general relativity, but also as the basis for crafting a theory of
quantum gravity [13, 66], the Holy Grail of modern physics.
Also in computer science, identical ideas on causality as partial orderings exist [48],
and through a pair of ‘partial order’-glasses, both the areas of relativity theory and the
organization of events in a distributed computational system look remarkably similar. In
other words, in high-level terms they essentially coincide.
1.2 Information content, propositional knowledge and domains
One may be interested in the information content of some pieces of data, for example in
terms of entropy. Typical measures of information content will assign some real number,
so that, since real numbers are totally ordered, we can decide which one of two of pieces of
data is the most informative one. This then induces a total preordering on these pieces of
data. In many cases, the actual values don’t really matter, merely what is more informative
than what matters. So in fact, rather than taking a valuation into real numbers, one can just
consider a total preordering on the pieces of data.
Now of course, if two pieces of data each constitute one bit, while their information
content is the same, these may be incomparable in terms of their propositional content. For
example, while “x is an apple” implies “x is fruit”, it is incomparable with “x is a lemon”.
As propositions, these pieces of data form a partial order, where a ≤ b stands for the fact
that a implies b, e.g. “being an apple” implies “being fruit”. This idea is the cornerstone to
algebraic logic [26], discussed in the next section.
For the purpose of combining informative and propositional content, domain theory
was crafted [63], as a new mathematical foundation for computation. Here, domains are
partial orders in which certain subsets have least upper bounds.
Definition 3. Given a partial ordering (X,≤), a subset Y ⊆ X has a least upper bound (or
join) if there is an element x ∈ X which is such that:
• ∀y ∈ Y : y ≤ x
• ∀x′ ∈ X : (∀y ∈ Y : y ≤ x′)⇒ x ≤ x′ .
6In this case we denote this element x as
∨
Y . A greatest lower bound (or meet)
∧
Y of
Y ⊆ X is defined similarly simply by replacing α ≤ β by β ≤ α in the above.
While we won’t discuss the nature of those subsets that have least upper bounds in a
domain, a particular example of a least upper in algebraic logic is disjunction a ∨ b, where
Y consists of two elements. Conjunction a ∧ b is the corresponding greatest lower bound.
Interestingly, the partial orders underpinning space-time are in fact also domains [55].
Hence at this order-theoretic level again two seemingly disjoint subjects become the same
when taking a sufficiently high-level perspective.
Also in this context, while it fails to be a domain and only captures propositional con-
tent up to symmetries, the majorization preordering [59] on probabilities has a range of
applications, ranging from economy [53] to quantum information theory [60], where it
captures degrees of entanglement. What is ordered here are descending discrete probabil-
ity distributions, that is, n-tuples (x1, . . . , xn) with
∑
i xi = 1 and that are such that xi ≥ xi+1.
We say that an ordered n-tuple (x1, . . . , xn) is majorized by (y1, . . . , yn) if
∀k ∈ {1, . . . , n − 1} :
i=k∑
i=1
xi ≤
i=k∑
i=1
yi .
Intuitively, this means that (y1, . . . , yn) is a ‘narrower’ or ‘sharper’ distribution than (y1, . . . , yn).
Unfortunately, majorization does not extend to a partial order on all probabilities, so it
fails to capture propositional content. A genuine partial ordering on probabilities in which
propositional structure naturally embeds is in [21]. It is ‘desperately looking for more
applications’, so please let us know if you know about one!
We refer the reader to [2] for the role of domain theory in computer science, where it
originated, and in particular to Martin’s tutorial [54] for a much broader range of applica-
tions in a variety of disciplines.
1.3 Logic and the theory of mathematical proofs
In algebraic logic, which traces back to Leibniz, one typically would like to treat “a implies
b” itself as a proposition, something which is realized by an implication connective, that is,
an operation ⇒: X × X → X on the partial ordering (X,≤). Typically, one also of course
assumes conjunction and disjunction, and in its weakest form implication can be defined
by the following order-theoretic stipulation:
(a ∧ b) ≤ c if and only if a ≤ (b⇒ c) (1)
One refers to partial orderings with such an implication as Heyting algebras. From eq. (1)
it immediately follows that the distributive law holds, that is,
a ∧ (b ∨ c) = (a ∧ b) ∨ (a ∧ c) ,
or in terms of words,
a AND (b OR c) = (a AND b) OR (a AND c) .
A special case of implication is a Boolean implication, which is defined in terms of
negation as a ⇒ b := ¬a ∨ b. We won’t go into the details of defining the negation
operation ¬ : X → X, but one property that it has is that it reverses the ordering, that is:
7• a ≤ b ⇔ ¬b ≤ ¬a .
In the case of a Boolean implication we speak of a Boolean algebra. The smallest Boolean
algebra has two elements, true and f alse, with f alse ≤ true.
Closely related to algebraic logic is algebraic proof theory, a meta-theory of mathe-
matical practice. One may indeed be interested from which assumptions one can deduce
which conclusions, and this gives rise to a preordering, where a . b stands for ‘from a we
can derive b’. Since possibly, from a we can derive b, as well as, from b one can derive
a, we are dealing with a proper preorder rather than a partial order. In this context, eq. (1)
corresponds to the so-called deduction theorem [41]. It states that if one can derive c from
the assumptions a and b, then this is equivalent to deriving that b implies c given a.
We stress here that . now represents the existence of a proof, but not a proof itself. We
will start to care about the proofs themselves in Sec. 3.
1.4 General ‘things’ and processes
The idea of the existence of a mathematical proof that transforms certain assumptions into
certain conclusions extends to general situations where processes transform certain things
into other things. For example, if I have a raw carrot and a raw potato I can transform
these into carrot-potato mash. On the other hand, one cannot transform an apple into a
lemon, nor carrot-potato mash into an egg. So in general, when one considers a collection
of things (or systems), and processes which transform things into other things, one obtains
a preordering that expresses what can be transformed into what. More precisely, a ≤ b
means that there exists a process that transforms a into b. The technical term for things in
computer science would be data-types, and for processes programs, in physics things are
physical systems and examples of processes are evolution and measurement, in cooking the
thing are the ingredients while example processes are boiling, spicing, mashing, etc.
thing / system process
Math. practice propositions proofs (e.g. lemma, theorem, etc.)
Physics physical system evolution, measurement etc.
Programming data type program
Chemistry chemical chemical reaction
Cooking ingredient boiling, spicing, mashing, etc.
Finance e.g. currencies money transactions
Engineering building materials construction work
2 Orders and composition
We mentioned that one cannot compare apples to lemons. However three apples and two
lemons is clearly less that five apples and four lemons. To formalize this, we need to have
a way of saying that we are ‘adding apples and lemons’. We will refer to this ‘adding’
as composition. Clearly, this composition needs to interact in a particular way with the
ordering such that, either increasing the apples or the lemons increases the order of the
composite. Note that adding apples to apples, or money to money, is just a special case of
8this, where the ordering is total, i.e. everything compares to everything, rather than being a
proper partial ordering in which some things don’t compare.
Definition 4. A monoid is a set X together with a binary operation · : X × X → X which is
both associative and admits a two-sided unit 1 ∈ X, that is, respectively:
• ∀x, y, z ∈ X : x · (y · z) = (x · y) · z
• ∀x ∈ X : 1 · x = x · 1 = x
A totally/partially/preordered monoid is a set X which is both a monoid and a total/partial/pre-
order, and which moreover satisfies monotonicity of the monoid multiplication:
• ∀x, y, x′, y′ ∈ X : x . y, x′ . y′ ⇒ x · x′ . y · y′
Many of the applications mentioned above extend to ordered monoids. For example, in
algebraic logic, either the conjunction or the disjunction operation yields a partially ordered
monoid. When tinking about things and processes, we can obtain an ordered monoid as in
the case of apples and lemons. We can compose different things, and we can compose the
processes acting thereon in parallel. In the case of mathematical proofs this would simply
mean that we prove b given a as well as proving d given c.
While in the case of apples and lemons composition is commutative, that is:
• ∀x, y ∈ X : x · y = y · x ,
composition of processes in time is typically non-commutative.
And we can indeed also think of the elements of an ordered monoid as processes them-
selves, the monoid composition then standing for process b after process a. The ordering
is then an ordering on processes, for example, given a certain proof, the proof of either a
stronger claim from the same assumptions, or the same claim from weaker assumptions
would be strictly below the given proof.
Summing the above up we obtain two distinct ordered monoids for the example of
mathematical proofs (as well as for the other examples):
• Composition of things, or parallel composition, where the ordered propositions
can be composed, that is, we can consider collections of assumptions rather than
individual ones, and comparing these may happen component-wise, but doesn’t have
to (cf. conjunction and disjunction as composition).
• Composition of processes, or, sequential composition, where the elements of the
monoid are the proofs themselves, rather than propositions. The composition is now
‘chaining’ proofs, that is, a proof of b given a and a proof c given b results in a proof
of c given a. The ordering is then in a sense the quality of the proof, in that a better
proof is one that achieves stronger conclusions from weaker assumptions.
More generally, non-commutative ordered monoids yield some interesting new applica-
tions, for example, in reasoning about knowledge and in natural language.
92.1 Galois adjoints as assigning causes and consequences
Definition 5. For two order-preseving maps f : A → B and g : B → A between partially
ordered sets (A,≤) and (B,≤) we say that f is left adjoint to g (or equivalently, that g is
right adjoint to f ), denoted f a g, if we have that:
• ∀a ∈ A, b ∈ B : f (a) ≤ b⇔ a ≤ g(b) ,
or what is easily seen to be equivalent [30], if we have that:
• ∀b ∈ B : f (g(b)) ≤ b and ∀a ∈ A : a ≤ g( f (a)) .
This at first somewhat convoluted looking definition has a very clear interpretation if we
think of f as a process which transform propositions a ∈ A of system A into propositions
b ∈ B of B. This goes as follows.
Assume we know that process f will take place (e.g. running it on a computer as a
computer program) but we would want to make sure that after running it b ∈ B holds,
and the means we have to impose this is to make sure that before running it some a ∈
A holds. Then, the Galois adjoint to f gives us the answer, namely, the necessary and
sufficient condition is to take a ≤ g(b). In computer science one refers to g(b) as the
weakest precondition to realize b by means of f [27, 36]. More generally, one can think of
g as assigning causes, while f assigns consequences for any kind of process [22].
Note in particular that eq. (1) is also of the form of a Galois adjunction. Indeed, explic-
itly putting quantifiers and re-ordering symbols, eq. (1) can be rewritten as:
• ∀c ∈ X, (∀a ∈ X, b ∈ X : (c ∧ a) ≤ b⇔ a ≤ (c⇒ b)) .
The expression within the large brackets is a Galois adjunction for A = B = C := X and:
f := (c ∧ −) : X → X and g := (c⇒ −) : X → X .
In eq. (1) we ask this Galois adjunction to be true for all c ∈ X, and all these conditions
together then define an implication connective (− ⇒ −) : X × X → X. More generally,
adjointness provides a comprehensive foundation for logic [47, 49].
While the author does not subscribe (anymore) to this approach, so-called quantum
logic [12, 61] is also an order-theoretic enterprise, and the corresponding ‘weak’ implica-
tion, the Sasaki hook [62], can best be understood in terms of Galois adjoints.
Birkhoff and von Neumann noted that observationally verifiable propositions of a quan-
tum system still form a partial ordering, which admits least upperbounds and greatest lower
bounds, but that the distributive law fails to hold, and as a consequence, that there is no con-
nective (− ⇒ −) as in e.q. (1) since that would imply distributivity (see Sec. 1.3). However,
there is an operation (c; −) : X × X → X for all c ∈ X which is such that:
• ∀a ∈ X, b ∈ X : Pc(a) ≤ b⇔ a ≤ (c; b) .
where Pc : X → X stands for the orthogonal projection on C, or in physical terminology, the
collapse onto c. The collapse is an actual physical process that happens when measuring a
quantum system, so in the light of the above discussion on causes and consequences, which
as discussed in [22] extends to these quantum logics, the operation (c; −) : X → X should
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be understood as assigning the weakest precondition (c ; b) ∈ X that has to hold before
the collapse in order for b ∈ X to hold after the collapse.
While as already mentioned, the author does not subscribe to quantum logic anymore,
Constantin Piron’s operational take on the subject [57, 61] has greatly influenced the au-
thor’s thinking. Unfortunately, Piron died during the final stages of writing of this chapter.
2.2 Dynamic (&) epistemic logic
Above we briefly discussed propositional logic, that is, describing the set of propositions
about a system as a partially ordered set. So what about the change of these propositions?
Actions, which change propositions can be described as maps acting on these propositions,
and form themselves an ordered monoid. It is easily seen that these maps should preserve
disjunctions, in order theoretic terms that is, greatest lower bounds. Indeed, if a OR b holds,
than after the action f , clearly f (a) OR f (b) should hold, so f (a ∨ b) = f (a) ∨ f (b). This
guarantees that these actions have left Galois adjoints, assigning causes.
Now, while propositions may be as they are, an agent may perceive them differently.
This may for example be due to lying actions by some agent who is supposed to communi-
cate these changes of propositions. These situations were considered by Baltag, Moss and
Solicki in [6], to what is referred to as dynamic epistemic logic, and it was shown in [5]
that all of this is most naturally cast in order theoretic terms.
This setting comprehends and stretches well beyond the fields of epistemic logic [56]
and dynamic logic [34], both conceptual variations on so-called modal logic [43], and all
of which are part of modern algebraic logic. They have a wide range of applications in
computer science, including soft- and hardware verification [67]. On the other hand, these
logics also underpin Carnap’s philosophy on semantics and ontology [15].
2.3 Linguistic types
We can also compose words in order to build sentences. However, not all strings of words
make up meaningful sentences, since meaningfulness imposes constraints on the grammat-
ical types of the words in the sentence.
By having a partial order relation besides a composition operation we can encode how
the overall grammatical type of a string of words evolves when composing it with other
types, and ultimately, make up a sentence. The ordering a1 · . . . · an ≤ b then encodes the
fact that the string of words of respective grammatical types a1, . . . , an has as its overall
type b. For example, if n denotes the type of a noun, tv the type of a transitive verb and s
the type of a (well-formed) sentence, then n · tv · n ≤ s expresses the fact that a noun (=
object), a transitive verb, and another noun (= subject), make up a well-formed sentence.
The remaining question is then how to establish a statement like a1 · . . . · an ≤ b. The
key idea is that some grammatical types are taken to be atomic, i.e. indecomposable, while
others are compound, and one considers additional operations, which may either be unary
or binary, subject to some laws that allow one to reduce type expressions. For example,
assuming that one has left- and right-‘pre-inverses’, respectively denoted −1(−) and (−)−1,
and subject to a · −1a ≤ 1 and a−1 · a ≤ 1, then for the compound transitive verb type:
tv = −1n · s · n−1
11
we have:
n · tv · n = n · −1n · s · n−1 · n ≤ 1 · s · 1 ≤ s ,
so we can indeed conclude that n · tv · n forms a sentence.
As the area of type grammars hasn’t reached a conclusion yet on the question of which
partially ordered monoids, or in short, pomonoids, best captures ‘universal grammatical
structure’, we give a relatively comprehensive historical overview of the structures that have
been proposed. Moreover, several of these will provide a stepping stone for the categorical
structures in the next section. Historically, the idea of universal grammar of course traces
back to Chomsky’s work in the 50’s [16]. The mathematical development has mainly be
driven by Lambek [44–46, 58], in many stages spanning some 60 years of work.
Definition 6. A protogroup [45] is a pomonoid
(X,≤, ∗(−), (−)∗)
where ∗(−) : X → X and (−)∗ : X → X are such that:
• ∀a, b ∈ X : a · ∗a ≤ 1 and b∗ · b ≤ 1 .
Definition 7. An Ajdukiewicz-Bar-Hillel pomonoid [3, 7] is a pomonoid
(X,≤, (−( −), (− −))
where (−( −) : X × X → X and (− −) : X × X → X are such that:
• ∀a, b, c ∈ X : a · (a ( c) ≤ c and (c  b) · b ≤ c .
For 1 the unit of the monoid and setting ∗a := a ( 1 and b∗ := 1  b, it then follows
that each Ajdukiewicz-Bar-Hillel pomonoid is a protogroup [45].
Definition 8. A residuated pomonoid [44] is a pomonoid
(X,≤, (−( −), (− −))
such that for all a, b ∈ X we have two Galois adjunctions:
(a · −) a (a ( −) and (− · b) a (− b) ,
that is, explicitly:
• ∀a, b, c ∈ X : b ≤ a ( c⇔ a · b ≤ c⇔ a ≤ c  b ,
or, equivalently, using the alternative characterization of the adjunctions:
• ∀a, b, c ∈ X : a · (a ( c) ≤ c , c ≤ a ( (a · c) , (c  b) · b ≤ c , c ≤ (c · b)  b .
From the second formulation in terms of four conditions it immediately follows that
each residuated pomonoid is a Ajdukiewicz-Bar-Hillel pomonoid.
But note in particular also that what we have here is a non-commutative generalization
of eq. (1) which defined an implication connective, conjunction being replaced by the (ev-
idently) non-commutative composition of words, and the implication (− ⇒ −) now having
a right-directed and right-directed counterpart, respectively (−( −) and (− −).
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Definition 9. A Grishin pomonoid [33] is a residuated pomonoid
(X,≤, (−( −), (− −), 0)
with a special element 0 ∈ X which is such that:
• 0  (a ( 0) = a = (0  a) ( 0 .
With some work one can show that every Grishin pomonoid is a residuated pomonoid
too e.g. see [45]. Now, anticipating the following definition we can set:
∗a := a ( 0 , a∗ := 0  a and a + b := ∗(b∗ · a∗) = (∗b · ∗a)∗ ,
(where the last equality is quite easy to prove) and then we have:
• a · ∗a ≤ 0 , 1 ≤ ∗a + a , b∗ · b ≤ 0 , 1 ≤ b + b∗ .
We also have that a ( c = ∗a + c and c  b = c + b∗. So now the non-commutative
implication resembles the Boolean implications that we discussed in Section 1.3, the *-
opertions playing the role of negation and the +-operation corresponding to the disjunction.
Definition 10. A pregroup [45] is a pomonoid
(X,≤, (−)∗, ∗(−))
where (−)∗ : X → X and ∗(−) : X → X are such that:
• a · ∗a ≤ 1 ≤ ∗a · a , b∗ · b ≤ 1 ≤ b · b∗ .
Hence, each pregroup is a Grishin pomonoid with · = + and 0 = 1, and each pregroup
is a protogroup which satisfies two additional conditions. In the case that (−)∗ = ∗(−) then
we obtain a group with a∗ = a−1, hence the name ‘pre’-group.
Right, that was a bit of a zoo! Still, there is a clear structural hierarchy. Below the
arrows represent the increase in equational content:
protogroup

ABH pom.

residuated pom.

Grishin pom.

pregroup
There are four kinds of inequalities that play a key role, which either reduce or introduce
types, and do this either in terms of (left/right) unary or a (left/right) binary connective.
Those in terms of a unary connective imply the corresponding ones involving a binary
connectives. The following table depicts these rules, with e ∈ {0, 1} and ◦ ∈ {·,+}.
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unary connective binary connective
type reduction a · ∗a ≤ e b∗ · b ≤ e a · (a ( c) ≤ c (c  b) · b ≤ c
type introduction 1 ≤ a ◦ a∗ 1 ≤ ∗b ◦ b c ≤ a ( (a ◦ c) c ≤ (c ◦ b)  b
3 Processes witnessing existence
In Sec. 1.4 we observed that for the very general setting of things/systems and processes
thereon orders witness the existence of a process between two things/systems. In Sec. 2 we
saw how composition of things interacts with ordering. On the other hand, in Sec. 2 we
also saw that monoid structures naturally arise when we consider process composition in
the sense of one process happening after another process.
Here we will make the passage from order witnessing existence of processes to ex-
plicitly describing these processes. Since processes themselves also come naturally with
sequential composition, and if the systems on which these act also compose, we will obtain
a structure with two interacting modes of composition. A dual perspective is that starting
from a process structure on a fixed system, we allow for variation of the system:
composable processes
allow varying systems
%%
ordered composable systems
explicitly describe processes
xx
dually composable processes between composable systems
Historically, this structure traces back to the work of Benabou [10] and MacLane [50].
Symbolically, this is what one is dealing with:
Definition 11. A strict symmetric monoidal category S consists of:
• a collection (typically a ‘class’) of things/systems |S| ,
• with a monoid structure (S ,⊗, 1) thereon,
and for each pair S , S ′ ∈ |S|
• a collection (typically a ‘set’) of processes S(S , S ′) ,
with two unital associative composition structures:
• ∀S , S ′, S ′′ ∈ |S|, (− ◦ −) : S(S , S ′) × S(S ′, S ′′)→ S(S , S ′′) ,
• ∀S , S ′, S ′′, S ′′′ ∈ |S|, (− ◦ −) : S(S , S ′) × S(S ′′, S ′′′)→ S(S ⊗ S ′′, S ′ ⊗ S ′′′) .
We denote S(S , S ′) also as f : S → S ′. Explicitly, associativity and unitality are:
• ∀ f : S → S ′, g : S ′ → S ′′, h : S ′′ → S ′′′ we have (h ◦ g) ◦ f = h ◦ (g ◦ f ) ,
• ∀ f : S → S ′, g : S ′′ → S ′′′, h : S ′′′′ → S ′′′′′ we have ( f ⊗ g) ⊗ h = f ⊗ (g ⊗ h) ,
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• ∀S ∈ |S| there exists an identity process 1S : S → S which is such that for all
f : S ′ → S , g : S → S ′ we have that 1S ◦ f = f and g ◦ 1S = g ,
• there exists an identity system I ∈ |S| which is such that for all S ∈ |S| we have that
I ⊗ S = S ⊗ I = S .
These composition structures moreover interact bifunctorialy, that is:
• ∀ f : S → S ′, f ′ : S ′ → S ′′, g : S ′′′ → S ′′′′, g′ : S ′′′′ → S ′′′′′ we have that:
( f ′ ◦ f ) ⊗ (g′ ◦ g) = ( f ′ ⊗ g′) ◦ ( f ⊗ g) , (2)
• ∀S , S ′ ∈ |S| we have that:
1S ⊗ 1S ′ = 1S⊗S ′ . (3)
Finally, we assume symmetry , that is,
• ∀S , S ′ ∈ |S| there exists a symmetry process σS ,S ′ : S ⊗ S ′ → S ′ ⊗ S , and these are
such that for all f : S → S ′, g : S ′′ → S ′′′ we have that:
σS ′,S ′′′ ◦ ( f ⊗ g) = (g ⊗ f ) ◦ σS ,S ′′ .
What a mess, or better, what a syntactic mess! The problem here is indeed of a syntac-
tic nature. The concept behind a strict symmetric monoidal category is intuitively obvious
but one wouldn’t get that intuition easily when reading the above definition. In fact, by
presenting strict symmetric monoidal categories rather than general symmetric monoidal
categories we already enormously simplified the presentation. In the strict case we assume
associativity and unitality of the ⊗-connective on-the-nose, while, as discussed in the in-
troduction, set-theory based mathematical models would typically be non-strict. However,
the physical reality itself is strict, which points at an inadequacy of its typical mathematical
models. Let us recall this physical conception of process theories.
There is a notion of system, to which we from now on will refer as type, and for each
pair of types of systems there are processes which take a system of the first type to the
system of the second type. These processes can be composed in two manners.
The first manner is sequentially, that is one process taking place after another process,
the second process having the output type of the first process as its input type.
The second manner is in parallel, that is, one process takes place while the other one
takes place, without any constraints on the input and output types.
Examples of particular systems and processes respectively are ‘nothing’ (cf. I in Defn. 11
above), and ‘doing nothing’ (cf. 1S in Defn. 11 above).
But there is more, ... Even in the strict definition above much of the structure is about
‘undoing’ unavoidable syntactic features.
For example, symmetry simply means that there is no significance to the list-ordering
of systems when writing S ⊗ S ′, that is, S ⊗ S ′ and S ′ ⊗ S describe one and the same thing,
and we can use σS ,S ′′ to pass from one description to the other.
Of course, sometimes the order does matter, like in the case of words making up a
sentence. Swapping words evidently changes the meaning of a sentence, and in most
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cases would make it even meaningless as swapping words of different grammatical types
would typically destroy the grammatical structure. So here, rather than a strict symmetric
monoidal category, we would consider a strict monoidal category, which boils down to
Defn. 11 without the σS ,S ′ -processes.
Turning our attention again on the ‘syntactic mess’, even more striking than the role
of symmetry in undoing the ordering of one-dimensional linear syntax, is the role played
by eq. (2). To expose its ‘undoing’-nature we will need to change language, from one-
dimensional linear syntax to two-dimensional pictures. This will also bring us much closer
to our desire of basing our conception of foundational mathematical structure on the idea
of high-levelness in use, given that the pictorial presentation gets rid of the artifacts of
set-theoretical representation, as illustrated in the introduction on the example of ‘three
things’. The diagrammatic language indeed on-the-nose captures the idea that strict sym-
metric monoidal categories aim to capture, but then still within a syntactic realm. The
study of these diagrammatic languages is becoming more and more prominent in a variety
of areas of mathematics, including modern algebra and topology.
In the two-dimensional pictures processes will be represented by boxes and the input-
and output-systems by wires:
f
output wire(s)
input wire(s)
Box =:
We can then immediately vary systems by varying the number of wires:
one system n sub -systems no system
︸︷︷︸
1
. . .︸      ︷︷      ︸
n
︸︷︷︸
0
The two compositions boil down to either connecting the output wire of one process to the
input wire of the other, or by simply putting the processes side-by-side:
g
f
f fg
Doing nothing is represented by a wire, and nothing, evidently, by nothing.
The rules of the game are: ‘only topology matters’, that is, if two pictures are topolog-
ically equivalent, then they represent the same situation, e.g.:
=
16
Now, the nontrivial symbolic equation ( f ′ ◦ f ) ⊗ (g′ ◦ g) = ( f ′ ⊗ g′) ◦ ( f ⊗ g) becomes:
=
f g
f’ g
‘
f g
f’ g
‘
i.e. a tautology! In other words, in this diagrammatic languages which more closely cap-
tures the mathematical structure of processes than its symbolic counterpart, essential sym-
bolic requirements become vacuous.
The reason is simple: there are two modes of composition that are in a sense ‘orthog-
onal’, but one tries to encode them in a single dimension. As a result, one needs to use
brackets to keep the formulas well-formed, but these brackets obviously have no counter-
part in reality. This is where they would be in the pictorial language:
=
f g
f’ g
‘
f g
f’ g
‘
A more detailed discussion of the upshot of graphical languages is in [23]. The devel-
opment of graphical languages for a variety of structures is an active area of research. For
a survey of the state of the art we refer to [65]. Also useful in this context are [4, 42, 68].
3.1 From-word-meaning-to-sentence-meaning processes
We can blow up the pomonoids of Sec. 2.3 to full-blown proper (typically non-symmetric)
monoidal categories by replacing each relationship a ≤ b by a collection S(a, b) of pro-
cesses. A residuated pomonoid then becomes a so-called bi-closed monoidal category, a
Grishin pomonoid then becomes a category of which the symmetric counterpart is called a
∗-autonomous category [8], and a pregroup then becomes a category of which the symmet-
ric counterpart is called a compact (closed) category [38, 39].
The non-symmetric case of compact (closed) categories has been referred to as planar
autonomous categories [37, 65], and the non-symmetric case of ∗-autonomous categories
as linearly distributive categories with negation [9, 17].
These symmetric categories have themselves been studied in great detail, since closed
symmetric monoidal categories capture multiplicative intuitionistic linear logic, while ∗-
autonomous categories capture classical linear logic [31, 64]. Compact closed categories
model a degenerate logic which has found applications in quantum information processing
[1, 28]. We will discuss this a bit more in the next section.
The following table summarizes the blow-up and symmetric restriction of some of the
pomonoids the arose when describing grammatical structure:
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grammatical types monoidal category symmetric case
residuated pomonoid biclosed monoidal closed symmetric monoidal
Grishin pomonoid linearly distributive + negation *-autonomous
pregroup planar autonomous compact closed
While, as explained in Sec. 2.3, the ordered structures capture how grammatical struc-
ture evolves when composing words, the categorical structures capture how the meaning of
words transforms into the meaning of sentences [24, 32]. The diagrammatic representation
of these categories then explicitly shows how meaning ‘flows’ within sentences. Here is an
example of such a ‘meaning flow’ taken from [24]:
=
not
like
BobAlice
does
Alice not like
not
Bob
meaning vectors of words
pregroup grammar
The verb “like” receives the subject “Alice” via the flow of meaning through “does” and
“not”, and also receives the subject “Bob”. Then it produces the meaning of the sentence
“Alice does like Bob”, which then is negated by the not-box.
The reader may verify that this particular explicit representation of meaning flow re-
quires at the grammatical level the full structure of a Grishin pomonoid.
3.2 Discipline transcending process structures
In fact, very similar pictures when modeling information flows in quantum protocols, in
work that inspired the above one on language meaning [1, 18, 19]:
=
f
f
=
f f
f
ALICE
BOB
=
ALICE
BOB
f
Here Alice and Bob share a Bell-state (the ‘cup’-shaped wire), then Alice performs an
operation that depends on a discrete variable f , and also Bob does an operation that depends
on f . The end-result is a perfect channel between Alice and Bob. This protocol is known
as quantum teleportation [11].
Another example is probabilistic Bayesian inference [25]:
   conditional
independence
=
P(C|AB)
A A
=
A
=
A
B
A
B
=
B
(BA) 1-
A
C 1- C 1-
C
P(AB|C) P(A|C) P(B|C) P(C|A) P(C|B)
P(C|B) P(C|A)
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Rather than just wires we now also have ‘dots’ connecting several wires. These structures
are also highly relevant in the quantum mechanical applications (e.g. see [20]), and since
recently, also in the linguistic applications, where they play the role of bases. They are also
key to quantum algebra [52, 68] and topological quantum field theory [42, 69]. The precise
connections between these uses have yet to been fully explored.
4 Closing
We started by discussing ordering on things, to which we then adjoined composition of
things, and by passing from existence of processes that take certain things to other things, to
explicitly representing them, we ended with a structure which is most naturally represented,
not by a syntactic, but by a diagrammatic language.
We gave examples of applications of these structures in a wide range of disciplines.
The message that we tried to pass to the reader is that these structure are very basic, in that
they appear in such a huge range of situations when taking a high-level perspective.
It would therefore be natural to, before doing anything fancy, to give these structures a
privileged status. Then, as a first next step, other well-understood structure could come in
as, for example, so-called categorical enrichment [14, 40]. Evidently, it would be nice to
take this even further, and see how far one could ultimately get by setting up this style of
structural hierarchy driven by high-levelness of actual phenomena.
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